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ABSTRACT
This thesis looks at the evolution of the Federal Reserve’s mandate and regulatory
responsibilities as a result of the Global Financial Crisis. The onset of the crisis exposed
the financial system to risks that had yet to be identified by the traditional
microprudential regulatory framework, necessitating a rapid and unconventional response
in order to prevent widespread financial collapse. Now, in 2015, as most of the scourges
of the crisis are in the recent past, practitioners are beginning to not only pick up the
pieces but attempting to reform the system to increase resilience in the future. One of the
proposals taking center stage in this effort is an increased focus on financial stability in
economic policymaking, in order to prevent the meteoric rise in unsustainable risk that
contributed to the crisis arising just eight years ago. This need for reform is juxtaposed
with the theoretical thrust to maintain central bank independence. The interaction
between central bank independence and a financial stability mandate will be discussed,
with a focus on macroprudential regulation.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, or the Federal Reserve System.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 changed the economic landscape of the United
States and the world. As the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression, many
widely-held thoughts and beliefs about the financial system, the global economy, and
policymaking are being rethought in its wake. The Global Financial Crisis has been
considered by some as a failure of the economics profession as the risks and weaknesses
that plagued the system were not recognized by the vast majority of practitioners in the
field. The Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, was positioned at the
epicenter of the crisis response, enacting unconventional policies to keep the economy
afloat. Now, in 2015, as most of the scourges of the crisis are in the recent past,
practitioners are beginning to not only pick up the pieces but attempting to reform the
system to increase resilience in the future. One of the proposals taking center stage in this
effort is an increased focus on financial stability in economic policymaking, in order to
prevent the meteoric rise in unsustainable risk that contributed to the crisis arising just
eight years ago.
This thesis looks at the activities of central banks, specifically the Federal
Reserve, from two distinct angles: the importance of central bank independence and the
rise of a financial stability mandate. These two issues are related, as operational
independence is a theoretical and empirical benchmark of optimal central banking and
financial stability is an exigent need to be addressed for central banks around the world.
1

The Federal Reserve prides itself in being a central bank whose operations are
independent of the government or any other interest group and the adoption of a financial
stability mandate could potentially threaten the legitimacy of this established
independence.
One may wonder, then, why a discussion of independence, specifically, is crucial
in the consideration of a financial stability mandate. The exigency of a greater and more
detailed focus on financial stability and macroprudential regulation has been emphasized
and proven by the experience of the financial crisis. With little exception, there is
widespread agreement that systemic risk in the financial system is dangerous and must be
addressed, and that the world’s largest financial institutions must be more closely
monitored. There is also relatively widespread agreement that the Federal Reserve is a
technocratic organization with a century of experience in economic policymaking, thus
putting it at the fore of the emergence of a more comprehensive set of tools and mandates
addressing financial stability. However, in the current structure of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council, where the Federal Reserve is given a subordinate role, this expertise
and experience is at risk of going unnoticed and their independence may be threatened.
Therefore, the nexus between financial stability and the role of the Federal Reserve, with
respect to central bank independence, is less well-defined and, thus, will be addressed
here.
The thesis is organized as follows. Section two looks at the theoretical
underpinnings of central bank independence, contrasting how independence is defined in
the literature with how it may manifest in the post-crisis world. The issue of mandate
adherence and mission creep will be of distinct concern as this issue is likely to arise as
2

the Federal Reserve, or any central bank, takes a more activist stance in maintaining
financial stability. This section lays a foundation for the structure of central bank
independence and serves as a reference point for the interaction of this independence and
financial stability in later sections. Section three provides an overview of the Federal
Reserve’s actions during the crisis and looks specifically at the unconventional policies
enacted by the Federal Reserve during this time. Though not directly related to the
financial stability mandate, these policy actions set the stage for the Federal Reserve to be
more activist, discretionary and innovative in policymaking, departing from their policy
toolbox used in the past. These unconventional actions lay the groundwork for an
evolving mandate and suggest that the nature of independence can evolve and change.
The specific discussion of financial stability, focusing on macroprudential policy
options, begins in section four. The time and cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk
are discussed as well as the policy options at the disposal of the central bank, or other
regulator, for mitigation. Following this same theme, section five considers the different
governance arrangements that have been advanced theoretically and in practice. This
section culminates in a discussion of the specific benefits and challenges that may arise if
the Federal Reserve is given a significant role in, or sole responsibility of,
macroprudential regulation. Section six contains a discussion of the potential dual
influences that central bank independence and the adoption of a financial stability
mandate can have on one another. On the one hand, putting an independent, accountable
and credible institution in charge of maintaining financial stability can greatly influence
and improve the effectiveness of these policies. On the other, the cooperative nature of
effective macroprudential regulation can serve to erode some level of independence that
3

may be deemed necessary for effective policymaking. Section seven will provide a brief
proposal for the structure of macroprudential regulation in the United States, designating
the Federal Reserve as the institution with responsibility for this policy function. The rise
in importance of financial stability and macroprudential regulation, though conceptually
in existence for decades, is, in practice, in a state of relative infancy. The conclusions
made here are suggestive and will likely be altered and changed as more information is
gained over the coming years.

4

CHAPTER TWO: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF MANDATE ADHERENCE
The concept of central bank independence was fundamentally changed as a result
of the crisis. As is the case with many theories and ideas, in economics and other fields,
one explanation can be predominant for a time until conditions change which invalidate
it. In this case, the idea that independent central banks with a pre-specified mandate and a
limited range of tools with which to fulfill that mandate represented the ideal institutional
design for economic growth and low and stable inflation was overturned when the crisis
occurred. Then, a central bank with the expertise and ability to enact reactionary and
unconventional policies to keep the economy afloat was an immense asset. There has not
been enough time for a new independence literature to rise out of the rubble of the crisis,
but it can be confidently advanced that the concept of central bank independence has
changed from what it once was. This section will look at the concept of central bank
independence and mandate adherence as it has historically been advanced before looking
at how it has changed in the last eight years.
Central bank independence has been a general tenet of ‘prudent’ monetary
policymaking and central banking since the 1980s.1 The idea is that the independence of
the central bank will insulate monetary policymaking, and other central bank activities,
from the influence of politicians. This is related to what is known as the time1

Forder 1998, 307
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inconsistency problem; it may be politically more attractive to spur economic growth,
and possibly increased inflation, in order to gain favor with the public, than it is to
prudently set policy according to the current economic conditions. The independent
central banker is thought to be isolated from these pressures and, thus more able to keep
macroeconomic aspects such as unemployment and inflation at a desirable level. As
monetary policy operates with a lag, it is important for the central bank to be forward
looking in its policymaking and rate setting. A driving factor of the popularity of central
bank independence is the fact that, evidence shows, with independence comes lower
inflation.2
Central bank independence is often considered in multiple categories including
legal, goal and instrument independence. Legal independence represents the fact that, by
law, the central bank is designated as independent without regard to operational, or other,
consideration. Goal independence is the ability of the central bank, in this case the
Federal Reserve, to set its own aims for monetary policy (e.g. a goal of 2% inflation).
Although this is a strong indicator of independence, many central banks opt to announce
goals in concert with the government in which they are located in order to build
credibility. Given this need for credibility and accountability to the public, there is the
view that “the institutional commitment to price stability should come from the
government...”3 This designation of goals helps balance independence with accountability
and is an important aspect in the operation of a nation’s central bank.

2

Cukierman 1992

3

Mishkin 2009, 495
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Instrument independence, “the central bank’s ability to independently set
monetary policy instruments, for example, the level of the interest rates, to achieve its
goals”4, is generally what most scholars and policymakers alike consider to be central
bank independence. With a pre-specified mandate or set of goals to operate under,
instrument independence grants the central bank the power to pursue whatever form of
policy is necessary to achieve these goals. It must be noted that the importance of central
bank independence is emphasized in the case of monetary policy. According to Kohn,
“the regulatory functions of the Federal Reserve have involved a very high degree of
cooperation and coordination with other agencies”5, and thus cannot be considered
entirely independent. The independence of monetary policy is the crux of the theory of
central bank independence issue and this is what must be maintained.
One of the seminal works on central bank independence is the index developed by
Cukierman in 1992. Although this measures central bank independence in a relatively
complex way, in practice, the index developed by Cukierman does not encompass all
ways that independence can be eroded. This index provides an interesting starting point
in which to analyze the unorthodox departure from other tenets of independence by the
Federal Reserve. Central bank independence, as defined by Cukierman, is “not
unconditional independence from government, but rather the independence to pursue the
objective of price stability, even at the cost of other objectives that may be more
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important to political authorities.”6 Although many indices and measures of central bank
independence have been created, Cukierman’s is often said to be the most complete. The
behavior of central banks regarding independence during crises can still be categorized as
a newly emerging field as the importance of central bank independence came into
‘vogue’ in the 1980s and 1990s.7 It is, therefore, relevant and important to recognize that
the landscape of central bank independence is changing and cannot be assessed on, what
are becoming, relatively antiquated indicators.
One of the ways in which central bank independence is assessed is by looking at a
central bank’s adherence to their pre-specified mandate. The Federal Reserve’s mandate,
originally set by Congress and amended in 1977, is stated as the maintenance of
“maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”8 which is
most often captured as the dual mandate of full employment and price stability.
According to Pattipeilohy et al, “the monetary policy strategy of central banks should be
considered against the background of their mandates.”9 Though many indicators exist, for
the purpose of this paper, we will focus on the adherence or lack therefore, to the
specified mandate as evidence for the drift away from central bank independence.
Though many of the unconventional monetary policies were enacted with the explicit
goal to ensure price stability, various factors indicate that this announcement was not
sufficient and these goals have yet to be realized.
6
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Another important aspect of mandates with respect to central bank independence
is the limits which are placed on the central banks in conducting policies. According to
Capie, “if the central bank is to be independent in the sense in which, say, the judiciary is
independent, then it requires a set of institutions to follow, just as judges required a set of
laws to implement.”10 The mandate of a central bank is, thus, a factor put in place to
disallow bank officials and governors from changing it as a result of differing conditions
or needs. Though this seems to fly in the face of the general tenet of ‘independence’, it is
a necessary factor to ensure that a central bank operates with the correct goals in mind.
This leads to the conclusion that independent central banks are not able to adjust or
change their mandates as a result of current economic or financial conditions but must
adhere to the mandates outlined to remain accountable and independent.
The original theoretical thrust of central bank independence was to ameliorate the
time inconsistency problem by disallowing politicians to manipulate monetary policy for
their own goals and gains. As can be seen, and easily understood, this is generally not the
aim of central bank independence, monetary policy, or even politicians in the response to
financial and economic crisis. According to Alan Blinder in a 2012 speech: “My
conclusion is that, in a crisis, preserving strict central bank independence is neither
possible nor desirable.”11 Central bank independence, though beneficial to keep political
considerations away from the management of monetary policy, may be ineffective, and
possibly even harmful, to the management of an economy during a financial crisis.
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Capie and Wood 2013, 380
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Blinder 2012, 6
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Instead, the addition of new missions and mandates, as well as extensive cooperation
between the central bank and government officials may be necessary.
As can be seen by the behavior of the Federal Reserve during the crisis, economic
growth and stability was paramount. Central banks are also focusing on financial stability
and macro-prudential regulation. Many of the quantitative easing policies discussed in
this study had the explicit aim and effect of enhancing financial stability and providing
credit to struggling sectors. It cannot be argued that this is a negative mission and, in fact,
was exigently needed to stave off the effects of the crisis. However, this is an indication
of a changing mandate and, therefore, also is suggestive of less importance being placed
on strict central bank independence. In addition, “even if narrow monetary policy
independence remains intact, the boundaries between monetary and macroprudential
policies are often blurred”, and this can operate as a threat to independence.12 Though this
is not a function specified by the mandates, it is also a rising concern in the international
economy precipitated by the global financial crisis.
The truth is that the explicit goal of all involved in responding to a financial crisis
is to keep the economy functioning to its maximum potential at the point considered. If
this goes against a central bank mandate, or if central bank independence is temporarily
undermined, it may be a secondary issue when compared to the efficacy of the economy.
It can be fairly argued that the landscape of independence was greatly altered as a result
of the financial crisis as it represented the first interaction of the independent Federal
Reserve with a crisis of such a large size and scope. Given that the idea of central bank
independence became popular in the 1980s, the experience of the Federal Reserve
12

Marcus 2012
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operating in a crisis of a vastly interconnected financial system and global economy is
uncharted territory for the theoreticians of independence. Although mandate adherence is
an important ingredient for the accountability and functioning of an independent central
bank, the Federal Reserve’s ability to adjust and implement policies appropriate for the
current economic climate can also be seen as a valuable addition to, and aspect of,
independence. If the Federal Reserve had been operating under a strictly rule-based
monetary policy regime where the creation of unconventional monetary policies was not
permitted, chances are that the economy would have suffered to a greater extent than was
seen in reality. Though one can never assert the results of a counterfactual with certainty,
the ability and expertise of the Federal Reserve to rapidly adjust and drastically alter the
policy landscape is a positive attribute in unusual and exigent crisis circumstances.
Along with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis and the unconventional
actions of the Federal Reserve has come a potential shift in the importance of
independence. This was the first major crisis event to hit the United States, and
reverberate globally, since the advent of central bank independence and, thus, we see that
some of the generally accepted tenets may not apply. Therefore, it cannot be fully argued
that the Federal Reserve’s actions during the crisis constitute a breach of independence as
this idea of independence is not fully developed in a crisis situation. In this case, the
Federal Reserve’s ability to rapidly adjust and enact policies to stave off the effects of the
crisis could be a testament of greater independence than strict adherence to a prespecified mandate and the policy tools used to fulfill it. The crisis rendered the dual

11

mandate of price stability and full employment temporarily moot while financial stability
and emergency stabilization came to the fore.
The experience of the recent crisis calls for the question to be asked, what exactly
is central bank independence? The nature of central bank independence has been
fundamentally changed by the crisis, with the ebb and flow of various policy priorities
being ranked according to circumstances, as opposed to pre-specified mandates. Since
complete independence cannot be defined by a simple theory or idea and it is ultimately
economic performance that determines the effectiveness of a given administration or
crisis response, the crisis can be considered a stark turning point. In the aftermath of the
crisis, the quick actions of the Federal Reserve, though, at times, going against their
mandate and acceptable tools, may be considered the most valuable asset of
independence. The ability to enact these policies without going through a lengthy process
to get them approved by Congress or some other governmental body is considered an
asset. Another important aspect concerning independence is how the general public views
the Federal Reserve in the scope of its independence. There are many who see
independence as a way for the Federal Reserve to conceal the scope of its powers from
the general public and the government and, thus, call for the organization to be reined in.
However, only considering the experience of the crisis, the Federal Reserve’s ability to
make quick, concise and effective decisions in order to keep the system afloat defined its
independence. It could not be measured on an index or assigned a score, but, in the
moment, it was effective. The choice is no longer between low and stable inflation and
full employment (it is arguable if this was ever the ‘real’ choice anyway), but rather about

12

retaining the ability to adapt policies and responses to an ever-changing economic
landscape. The importance of independence arose as a result of economic events and its
downfall may also, with slightly less than forty years of theoretical supremacy, the idea
of central bank independence is far from set in stone.
In the scope of economic theory, central bank independence is a relatively
youthful idea which, given the experience of 2007-2009, should be flexibly calibrated
commensurate with the current economic situation. Considering that the global economy,
and specifically the financial system, is continually evolving, the adoption of a financial
stability mandate would be a natural extension to the Federal Reserve’s current mandate
and should be an action accepted and condoned by the strictest advocates of central bank
independence.
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CHAPTER THREE: OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS,
SYSTEMIC RISK ISSUES AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES
In the depths of the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve’s traditional monetary
policy tools became exhausted. Interbank lending was all but frozen and the system was
suffering from a widespread crisis of confidence. The failure, or near-failure, of firms that
were deemed ‘too big to fail’ had incited fear and uncertainty into the system and no end
was in sight. Undetected systemic risks had emerged that threatened the foundation that
the financial system of the United States had previously stood proudly upon and
something needed to be done.
A notable shift in Federal Reserve behavior resulting from the crisis was their
lending and support of investment banks that were, until recently, outside of the purview
of their mandate. Many questioned the Federal Reserve’s legal ability and wisdom of
lending to non-depository institutions. However, Article 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act
begins with the following:
“In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System…may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as
the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with the
provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to discount for any
participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility, notes, drafts,
and bills of exchange…”13

13

Federal Reserve Act, Article 13(3)
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This specifies that the Federal Reserve, in exceptional circumstances, can lend to
almost any eligible and legitimate business, corporation, or institution; therefore,
investment banks would be included. The situation during the financial crisis was such
that some of the most systemically important institutions were struggling, and these
investment banks and institutions were outside the normally operating scope of the
Federal Reserve. Therefore, Article 13(3) was invoked to save the economy from what
could have been utter collapse and extensive international contagion.
Given that the Federal Reserve does have the ability and duty to take unusual
steps in such a situation, what did it do in this case? The following section discusses the
unorthodox policy programs implemented by the Federal Reserve in the initial aftermath
of the financial crisis. It is important to note that every program implemented by the
Federal Reserve during the global financial crisis is not mentioned, as that is outside the
scope of this thesis. The programs discussed are: the Term Auction Facility, Primary
Dealer Credit Facility, Term Securities Lending Facility, and Quantitative Easing.
The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was established in 2007 and was utilized in
order to encourage lending to banks and other depository institutions to increase liquidity
in the financial system. This was also undertaken to address the increasing interest rate
spread, arising primarily as a result of the lack of trust in the interbank lending market.
These were collateralized loans with a term longer than the general term, overnight loans
generally disbursed at the Fed’s discount window. Various assets were accepted as
collateral but these loans were only given to institutions perceived to be sound.14 These
loans were disbursed in 28-day and 84-day increments. There has been speculation that
14

Armantier 2008
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this program was put in place in order to reduce the ‘stigma’ associated with banks
borrowing from the Fed’s discount window. Far from being just a reputational issue,
banks were reluctant to borrow from the discount window as it could signal distress or
financial instability.
Auctions were held to disburse the funds that allowed the Federal Reserve to
“control precisely how much, and when, liquidity would be injected into the markets.”15
This function also allowed a large amount of funds to be disbursed to a number of
different institutions, allowing money and liquidity to flow to where it was needed most.
The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), carried out on March 17, 2008, was
implemented to provide short-term funding to investment banks that generally participate
in open market operations and have a trading relationship with the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York.16 Traditionally, primary dealers do not have access to a lender of last
resort; however, in the modern financial context, “dealers are the institutions most likely
to experience liquidity shortages.”17 Whereas the TAF injected liquidity into depository
institutions, PDCF did so for dealers normally participating in the continually slowing
repo market. This was the first time that the Fed lent directly to investment banks, which
represented both the severity of the crisis and the financial importance of these
institutions.
The loans granted by PDCF are based on collateral above the value of the loan
itself. Originally only investment grade collateral was accepted; however, as the collapse
15
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of Lehman Brothers became imminent, the scope and type of acceptable collateral was
expanded. In this action, “all the kinds of collateral then in use in tri-party repo –
including non-investment grade securities and equities – became eligible for pledge in the
PDCF.”18 This action allowed the primary dealers to make use of the loans on more
amicable terms and to increase coverage of the PDCF “in the event that a failure of a
primary dealer led to severe funding disruptions for the surviving dealers.”19 Moral
hazard issues arose as a result of the funding of the PDCF as many analysts saw this as
encouraging investment banks to take on riskier assets.
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was introduced in March 2008, to
further provide liquidity to markets in the face of the financial crisis. Specifically, TSLF
“allows primary dealers over time to borrow up to $200 billion in Treasury securities for
a term of twenty-eight days by pledging as collateral other securities, including agency
debt securities and MBS.”20 This allows the primary dealers to hold Treasury securities as
collateral for other transactions, allowing them to be more active in the repo market. As it
occurs as an exchange for different types of securities, this does not change the
composition of the institutions’ reserve and, thus, does not affect the Federal Reserves’
traditional focus on interest rate levels.21
In contrast to the PDCF, a standing facility, the TSLF was created as an auction
facility; allowing primary dealers to approach the Fed as a group as opposed to being
18
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subject to individual scrutiny by the market. The eligible collateral to exchange for the
Treasuries are separated into two ‘schedules’, one with Treasuries themselves, agency
debt securities, and MBS securities, and one accepting all other investment-grade
securities.22 As in the PDCF, collateral is only accepted with a ‘haircut’, meaning that the
value of the collateral is above the value of the securities on auction.
The unconventional policy which is most often discussed in industry, academia
and the media is quantitative easing. Officially ended in the latter part of 2014, the effect
of and exit from these policies proves to be an important task for the Federal Reserve.
Although many critics of unconventional monetary policies believe that quantitative
easing, effectively, goes against central banks’ mandates, the effect has yet to be seen.
One thing is certain; the implementation of quantitative easing programs has changed the
monetary policy landscape that central banks had been acting within.
The policy is targeted, generally, at interest rate sensitive sectors such as housing
and corporate finance and is aimed at decreasing interest rates to make investment more
attractive. Central bank asset purchases provide the impetus for this change as their
balance sheets are expanded while more liquidity is injected into the economy, providing
the potential for an increase in the monetary base. In the case of the most recent crisis,
especially in the United States, the primary targeted sector was housing; “the purchase of
these assets…provided liquidity to a market that had dried up in the wake of the financial
crisis and helped lower mortgage interest rates directly and provided credit lines to an

22

Fleming et al 2009, 5

18

important part of the economy.”23 The transmission of lower interest rates to consumer
sectors is also a crucial aspect of quantitative easing as this facilitates the effect that these
policies have on the real economy.
Though the name quantitative easing implies a purely numerical or ‘magnituderelated’ measure of monetary policy, there is a more quality-based measure of easing
commonly known as qualitative easing. Although not concerned directly with the
quantity of assets held, qualitative easing affects the composition and maturity of assets
held on a bank’s otherwise unchanged balance sheet. For banks such as the Federal
Reserve, this manifested in the form of a switch between short-term and long-term
securities which, in turn, was aimed at affecting long-term interest rates in the economy.
However, “nonconventional monetary policies consisted mainly of qualitative easing
until the failure of Lehman, while thereafter central bank balance sheets expanded
strongly…implying a combination of both quantitative and qualitative easing.”24 The
synthesis of these two policy actions served to lower the interest rates in the economies
considered, as well as worked to ensure that this transmission occurred at both the short
and long end of the market.
Quantitative easing is an example of a set of policies, enacted in order to get the
United States ‘back on track’ after the Global Financial Crisis. Essentially, conventional
monetary policy actions were exhausted when the zero lower bound (ZLB) was reached
for short-term interest rates. These policies, and the central bankers that implemented
them, have been lauded for rescuing their economies from what could have been a
23
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catastrophic collapse; however, whether or not these policies are beneficial or harmful in
the long-run has yet to be seen. What is certain, though, is that the implementation of
these policies and the methods which were utilized to undertake them were not in the
‘playbook’ of the Federal Reserve as specified by its mandates. Following is a description
of the main policy actions and currently observable economic effects of quantitative
easing.
The Federal Reserve enacted strong large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs),
more commonly known as quantitative easing policies, increasing the balance sheet from
$0.9 trillion to $4 trillion between 2007 and 2013.25 The quantitative easing (QE)
programs were enacted in three phases, aptly referred to as: QE1 (2009), QE2 (2010), and
QE3 (2012-2014). In October 2014, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
announced the end of quantitative easing but, at the time of this writing, the complete exit
strategy has yet to be seen.
The first round of quantitative easing, QE1, occurred in 2009, when the Fed
“announced a commitment to purchase $300 billion of Treasury securities, $200 billion
of agency debt, and $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities.”26 The Federal
Reserve purchased assets from the GSEs (Fannie and Freddie) primarily to focus on the
housing markets which were the hardest hit in the crisis.27 As these were relatively shortterm assets, they have since matured and are no longer on the Fed’s balance sheet. It can
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be argued that the effects of QE1 have been largely sterilized as it was enacted in the
height of the recession and the emergency lending was exigently needed.
Likewise, the second round of quantitative easing, QE2, was targeted at
increasing the Fed’s balance sheet, this time through the purchase of exclusively Treasury
securities. Also included in the announcement of QE2 was the intention of the Fed to
continually replace maturing securities with requisite purchases of Treasury securities to
maintain the size of the continually increasing balance sheet.28
In 2011, the Federal Reserve embarked on the Maturity Extension Program, aptly
nicknamed ‘Operation Twist’ (such a program had also been conducted in the
early1960s). The Federal Reserve sold $400 billion in short-term securities (which are
held on the balance sheet in normal times) and purchased $400 billion in long-term
securities which, essentially, had the effect of twisting the yield curve.29 This is an
example of qualitative easing as the size of the balance sheet did not change, but the
composition was manipulated. The purpose of this program was to provide some stimulus
to the economy but not as much as would have resulted from another QE program.30
QE3, the most recent quantitative easing program, is that which engenders the
most uncertainty and speculation as it has only recently been concluded but still no clear
‘exit’ is defined. Originally the Fed announced that it would purchase $40 billion of
agency MBS every month, then, after the end of the Maturity Extension Program,
pledged to continue to purchase $45 billion in Treasury securities per month thereby
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expanding the balance sheet further.31 On October 29, 2014, the FOMC announced that
the economy had reached a point of recovery where it was deemed appropriate to end the
asset purchases associated with QE3.32 Although they continue to reinvest and keep
interest rates historically low, the announcement served as an indication that an exit from
these unconventional programs would be seen sooner, rather than later.
An interesting aspect to note about the QE programs enacted by the Fed is that
they have, effectively, lowered the spread between short and long term interest rates,
even on securities that were not directly purchased in the programs.33 This shows that the
transmission mechanism operated effectively in this case, as the goal was to both
decrease interest rates in general and to see the spread decrease as well. Although
inflation has not been seen as a result of these policies as of today, there is still muted
fear, on behalf of the so-called ‘inflation hawks’, that this may occur either through
monetary mechanisms or as a result of expectations. If this were to manifest, it could be
concluded that these QE programs served to retroactively depart from the Federal
Reserve’s mandate of price stability. Alternatively, some have advanced the thought that
because 2% inflation has not been restored as a result of these policies, that they weren’t
aggressive enough and this has, in effect, not done enough to fulfill the mandate of price
stability.34 It must be noted that the policies enacted by the Federal Reserve as a response
to the crisis have been purely reactionary.
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The actions of the Federal Reserve also take on a quasi-fiscal character as
evidenced by the large amount of Treasury securities that were purchased as part of the
program. Some critics of these programs have advanced that this may be an action taken
in order to implicitly finance or aid the fiscal deficit.35 This would greatly undermine
central bank independence as, under this scenario, the Federal Reserve would be working
to enable government spending that otherwise might not have been possible. However, to
this point, there is not much evidence to suggest that the policies enacted by the Federal
Reserve completely go against the dual mandate of price stability and full employment,
so this cannot be considered a full departure from central bank independence at this point
in the research.
Although the Federal Reserve often stated price stability as the impetus for
implementing quantitative easing programs, the timing of this implementation would
suggest that these programs were enacted under dire and uncertain economic conditions.
According to Blinder, “[in a crisis] the principle objective of the central bank changes.
It’s no longer fighting inflation, which may be unnecessary or even counterproductive if a
slump is imminent, but rather holding the financial system together.”36 These programs
were enacted to lower interest rates and provide funding to key sectors so that the
economy of the United States could rise out of the crisis to the greatest extent possible.
Though this may have been, indeed, necessary at the time, this motivation departs from
their strict mandates that the tenets of central bank independence dictates that they
follow. It can be asserted that the Federal Reserve and other agencies were not able to
35
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identify emerging systemic risks in the economy which would eventually precipitate the
onset of the crisis. An additional mandate of financial stability would seek to ameliorate
this problem by proactively engaging financial institutions in policies and behaviors that
would seek to avoid vast risk build-up.
It must also be noted that criticisms of quantitative easing, especially as the
programs are winding down, are part of a relatively new field of study. Much of the
research done on quantitative easing at this point is produced by the very banks that
conduct these policies and, thus, the process is presented in a more positive light than it
may otherwise be. We are, undoubtedly, still living in a global economy that has been
jarred by the Global Financial Crisis and, thus, seem less concerned with central banks
overstepping their bounds to such a degree as we have seen.
At this point in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, generalization
concerning the effectiveness and appropriateness of the Federal Reserve’s
unconventional monetary policy is difficult. This is, primarily, because of the time lag
associated with both conventional and unconventional policies alike. Therefore, much of
the criticism or praise of the Federal Reserve’s policies between 2007 and today are
backed merely by speculation and inference. As said by Jean-Claude Trichet, “it is
difficult to know what to say about the recent past.”37 However, there are several
takeaways from the crisis at this time that point to some necessary reforms to the
structure and practice of central banking.
Much conflict and controversy has surrounded the use and usefulness of
unconventional monetary policy in general. The risks associated with utilizing these
37
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instruments are, by their very nature, unknown; however, with an interconnected
economy on the brink of collapse, past experience cannot accurately inform present or
future policy. Even considering the uncertainty surrounding these policies, “a full blown
collapse of the financial system of the advanced economies would have beared an
unacceptable cost for the entire global economy, for all societies and people of the
world.”38
To some, this section may appear as a tangential aside to the individual issues of
central bank independence and financial stability; in actuality, the policies enacted and
economic conditions experienced in the crisis may provide the conceptual ‘glue’ holding
these two concepts together. It can be argued that, as a result of the crisis, the entire
functional and theoretical landscape of optimal central bank independence was changed.
This can be described, in part, through the mechanism of the muted importance of price
stability and full employment during the crisis, as a direct result of ignored and almost
wholly unnoticed financial stability issues in the economy. At the broadest level, the
experience of the crisis teaches that a focus on price stability, full employment and
microprudential institution-based regulation is simply not enough. An eye for financial
stability must be integrated in the system lest systemic risk precipitates a crisis of this
magnitude again. In a more granular sense, this is suggestive of the fact that the nature of
central bank independence may be forever changed because of the crisis. The full detail
of this imminent change is beyond the scope of this paper, but it must be noted that we
may be on the cusp of a rethinking of the theoretical underpinnings of central bank
independence.
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A detailed account of the unconventional monetary policies enacted by the
Federal Reserve is also illustrative of the need for financial stability as most were
undertaken to stabilize the system and prevent it from collapsing. This revealed a gap in
policymaking that a focus on price stability and employment, alone, will never fill.
Taking the experience of the recent past into consideration, it is obvious that financial
stability must be more carefully considered in the day-to-day operation of the Federal
Reserve and other institutions like it. The question of whether or not the Federal Reserve
should adopt an explicit financial stability mandate is more nuanced and will be
discussed in a later section.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROAD AHEAD - ADDRESSING THE IMPORTANCE
OF SYSTEMIC RISK AND MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
One of the lessons learned from the experience of the recent crisis is the crucial
role of central banks in maintaining financial stability. This departs from the Federal
Reserve’s dual mandate of full employment and price stability, however, is appearing to
be an even more exigent cause, especially in the face of widespread financial crisis.
At its inception, one of the four functions of the Federal Reserve was the
monitoring and maintenance of financial stability in the economy. By many measures, it
appears as if this was long-forgotten when the Global Financial Crisis hit. With a system
of complicated financial innovations and products that eluded even the brightest of
economic minds and a financial system that was too big (or, to draw on Roubini, too
interconnected) to fail, financial stability was virtually ignored while profits and risk
bloomed. When financial innovation, enabled by technology, outpaces the ability of
regulators to comprehend, much less control, a focus on overall financial stability is
exigent. However, given the current economic perceptions and the dual mandate of the
Federal Reserve, the sacrifices required to more wholly focus on financial stability may
be great. According to Reis, “financial stability must pose a trade-off with the other two
goals, so there must be situations where prices and activity are stable but financial
instability justifies a change in policy that potentially leads to recession or causes
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inflation to exceed its target.”39 We live in a world where inflation is feared. Instead of
viewing it as a monetary phenomenon that may happen for many different reasons, most
of America considers inflation to have a potentially damaging effect on the U.S.
economy. Much of the opposition to the unconventional monetary policies was advanced
with this rationale: that quantitative easing and the rapidly expanding balance sheet of the
Federal Reserve could trigger a large and damaging inflation. In reality, though, it
appears as if we are at more risk of deflation, not inflation. As of January 2015, the
inflation rate in the United States was -0.1%, far from the Federal Reserve’s 2% target.40
This statistic has an important effect on how central bank independence is considered
today. The evidence gathered proves that independent central banks do a better job at
maintaining a low and stable inflation level, but what happens when this inflation
becomes negative? This may seem like a small point to target in the literature, but, since
the nature of the ‘dependent variable’ of central bank independence may be
fundamentally changed in a crisis and recovery scenario, this opens up the possibility to a
rethinking of the concept of functional independence itself.
The policies aiming to maintain the stability of the financial system are labeled
macroprudential policies. Systemic risk and macroprudential regulation both fall under
the umbrella of financial stability, though both exert opposite effects on the economy.
Systemic risk threatens financial stability, whereas macroprudential regulation seeks to
bolster this stability while also being prepared to restore it when shocks do occur. The
purpose of macroprudential regulation is to essentially focus on those activities and firms
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within the real economy and financial sector that have the potential to affect the system
as a whole and threaten financial stability. Macroprudential policy can be applied in a
more granular way than traditional macroeconomic policy, targeting certain institutions,
exposures and sectors.41 This makes it more effective at targeting specific risk areas but
also potentially subjects these policies to far more scrutiny. Though the idea of
macroprudential policies have been around for decades42, only recently have these policy
possibilities reemerged as a serious option for expanding bank regulation.
Up until now, the majority of the focus on financial institution (primarily bank)
supervision was on microprudential regulation; assessing the risk factors and overall
health of individual institutions. Regulators such as the Federal Reserve and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation measure the financial health of institutions by analyzing
their balance sheets with respect to certain preset financial thresholds and the possibility
of economic and financial shocks. Macroprudential and microprudential aim to protect
the very actors that the prefix of the terms would suggest; macro seeks to protect the
financial system and overall economic output, where micro focuses on individual
institutions and protecting against consumer loss.43
It must be noted that macro and micro prudential regulation do not exist
independently from one another, but act in a synergistic way, aiming to ensure the health
of the financial system. For instance, the main pillar of microprudential regulation, the
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safety and soundness of individual institutions, is also crucially important for
macroprudential regulation. If the health of individual institutions is kept intact, this will,
no doubt, have an impact on the financial stability of the system from a macroprudential
perspective. Microprudential and macroprudential regulation come into conflict in the
inevitable situation when what might be optimal for an individual institution may be
damaging to the system as a whole. What may be profit-maximizing for an individual
bank, may contribute to the destabilization of the financial system; these possible adverse
effects need to be taken into account while constructing the macroprudential framework.
Besides the institution versus systemic focus difference, macroprudential and
microprudential regulation also differ in their respective assessment of the endogeneity of
risk. Whereas traditional supervision and regulation have considered risk to be
exogenous, occurring as shocks to the system; macroprudential considers risks as
endogenous, created by the very institutions acting within the system. Macroprudential
regulation considers risk on both the time and cross-sectional dimensions, employing
specific ‘tools’ to combat each. The time dimension considers the cyclicality of bank
behavior whereas cross-sectional looks at the effect of individual bank risk-taking. The
time dimension seeks to tackle the issue of the procyclicality of bank risk-taking44; where
banks increase lending and draw down on their stored capital during good financial times,
leaving them unprepared to ‘weather the storm’ when downturns in the business cycle
occur. The general thrust of the macroprudential policies and tools aimed at the time
dimension is to be a “countervailing force to the natural decline in measured risks in a
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boom and the subsequent rise in measured risks in the subsequent bust.”45; in other
words, to lean against the wind. These tools aim to build-up the resiliency of financial
institutions to shocks, both large and small, that can reverberate across the financial
system. Higher countercyclical capital and liquidity ratios, as proposed in Basel III, are
examples of tools targeting the time dimension and will be discussed further in this paper.
According to Galati and Moessner, “the cross-sectional dimension focuses on the
distribution of risk in the financial system at a point in time, and, in particular, the
common exposures that arise owing to balance sheet interlinkages, similar exposures and
associated behavioral responses.”46More simply, this dimension captures the specific
regulation needed for the case of systemically important, or ‘too big to fail’, financial
institutions. These specific institutions can be identified by their extensive size,
complexity and interconnectedness with the financial system.47 In addition, when many
of these large financial institutions were converted to bank holding companies after the
crisis (e.g. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs), this brought them even more assured
government insurance intervention in the event of failure. The bailouts for these large
firms were quite contentious, leading many to believe that the system was favoring Wall
Street over Main Street. The risk that the imprudent behavior of individual large
institutions will reverberate to the system as a whole is captured by this dimension. This
dimension also captures the growing linkages between financial institutions, both
domestically and internationally, that may exacerbate the spreading of a certain risk
45
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factor or shock to certain sectors of the economy. The cross-sectional dimension is often
compared to a ‘negative externality’ such as that produced by emitting carbon emissions
in the context of environmental pollution.48 A key component of macroprudential risk
management, in the cross-sectional dimension, is to detect key characteristics of an
institution that may make them either more vulnerable, or crucial, for systemic risk. For
example, “the role of ‘banks’ as suppliers of liquidity services of next to last resort
implies that financial distress at these institutions may have larger macro economic
costs”49. Tools intended to combat the endogeneity of risk on the cross-sectional
dimension aim at detecting and measuring each large or systemically important
institution’s individual contribution to systemic risk. This is an example where
microprudential and macroprudential regulation coincide: a focus on individual
institutions. It can be argued that, in this sense, macroprudential takes the already
established regulatory regime one step further, from ensuring the health of individual
institutions to working to ensure the health of the system as a whole; protecting it from
the adverse systemic effects of some these institutions’ activities.
It has been clearly identified that macroprudential regulation seeks to improve
financial stability while targeting systemic risks with the financial system that have the
potential to reverberate to the real economy (as was seen in the recent crisis). The task of
macroprudential policy is threefold: focusing on reducing the expected cost of
weaknesses in the economy, reducing the impact of the failure of individual institutions,
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as well as reducing the probability that these institutions will fail50. Bank and institution
failures do happen and can indicate an increasingly efficient system when technically
inefficient institutions are closed; however, it is essential to ensure that the majority of
institutions, especially those that are large and systemically important, do not threaten
financial stability. In the recent crisis, many of the institutions that would later ‘go under’
such as AIG and Lehman Brothers were not deposit-taking banks in the traditional sense.
These investment banks and other institutions have, in the past, been subject to lighter
regulation than other banks, with regulators operating under the assumption that the
principles of market discipline may serve to adequately limit them. Prior to the crisis,
there was less focus on regulation from the microprudential perspective, as the thought
was that their dealings were primarily with sophisticated investors who would be able to
glean more information, compared with the general depositor, about the institutions with
whom they were placing their money. These types of large institutions became what is
now commonly known as ‘too big to fail’ and generally are “complex and interconnected
financial institutions that may not rely on deposits for a large share of their funding, and
whose failure may spread and magnify losses throughout the financial system.”51 Even
though these institutions do not perform functions similar to those of traditional banks,
many of them provide services that these other financial institutions rely on. As was seen
in the recent crisis, the shadow banking system also contributed significantly to the buildup of systemic risk, “amplifying both the procyclicality and cross sectional dimension of
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system risk.”52 As these institutions have not traditionally been in the purview of
supervision and regulation, it is important that macroprudential policies span this gap as
the so-called “shadow banks” increase in importance and scope in the financial system.
According to Nier, macroprudential regulation should consider two distinct, though
potentially overlapping, sets of institutions: those that are individually systemic and
collectively systemic.53 The concept of individually systemic institutions is, likely, most
widely known as a result of the crisis. These are the institutions that are ‘too big to fail’,
whose failure has the potential to disrupt the entire system. It must be noted that, these
institutions are often not banks in the traditional sense but, “may instead provide credit,
insurance, and critical payment, clearing, and settlement services to other parts of the
financial system.”54 Collectively, systemic institutions may be individually small but,
when taken together, have the potential to affect the aggregate weakness of the economy.
For example, commercial banks, taken together, are considered collectively systemic as
weakness or a specific shock in this sector has the potential to reverberate to the entire
system. Under these definitions, it can be argued that virtually no financial institution or
collective set of institutions, in the financial system can escape the classification, in some
way or another, of being considered systemically important. Due to the scope of this
definition, compounded with the experience of the recent crisis, the importance of
macroprudential regulation is further highlighted.
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Macroprudential Policy Tools
Prior to further discussion on the formulation of macroprudential policy, the role
of the Federal Reserve and possible implications of its adoption, it is crucial to
understand the tools that are currently available for use in this policy domain.
There are many macroprudential policy tools that could be put in place to combat
systemic risk. These tools can either be designed specifically for macroprudential policy
or those that are already in place can be utilized with a macroprudential goal. According
to the IMF, for a certain policy instrument to be effective for macroprudential regulation,
it should meet the following four criteria: effective in limiting systemic risk and creating
buffers to be called upon in periods of stress; limited opportunities for arbitrage; aimed at
the roots of systemic risk; least distortionary as possible to the financial system and real
economy.55 Given the fact that the rise in prominence of macroprudential policy has
occurred quite recently, assessments of these instruments by the aforementioned criteria
are tenuous at best. Table 1 serves as a reference guide for the many macroprudential
policy instruments to be considered. These instruments are divided on the time and crosssectional dimension and looks at instruments both created exclusively to fight systemic
risk and those that can be recalibrated from other regulation or policies to contribute to
that aim.
Table 1 – Macroprudential Instruments
Category
I: Instruments
developed specifically to
55

Time- Dimension


Countercyclical
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Risk-Dimension


Systemic capital

capital buffers

manage systemic risk


Through-the-cycle
valuation of margins
or haircuts for repos



Levy on non-core
deposits



Countercyclical
change in risk
weights for exposure
to certain sectors



Time-varying
systemic liquidity
surcharges
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surcharges


Systemic liquidity
charges



Levy on non-core
liabilities



Higher capital
charges for trades
not cleared through
CCPs

Table 1 – Macroprudential Instruments - Continued
Category
II: Recalibrated
Instruments

Time- Dimension

Risk-Dimension



Time-varying LTV,
Debt-to-Income
(DTI) and Loan-ToIncome (LTI) caps



Powers to break up
financial firms on
systemic risk
concerns



Time-varying limits
in currency
mismatch or
exposure (e.g. real
estate)



Capital charge on
derivative payables



Deposit insurance
risk premiums
sensitive to
systemic risk



Restrictions on
permissible
activities (e.g. ban
on proprietary
trading for
systemically
important banks)



Time-varying limits
on loan-to-deposit
ratio



Time-varying caps
and limits on credit
or credit growth



Dynamic
provisioning



Stressed VaR to
build additional
capital buffer
against market risk
during a boom



Rescaling riskweights by
incorporating
recessionary
conditions in the
probability of
default assumptions
(PDs)

Source: IMF (2011)
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Time Dimension
The crux of the tools responsible for addressing the time dimension of
macroprudential policy is the move towards countercyclical risk-taking on behalf of
financial institutions. In the years leading up to the crisis, lending standards were relaxed
and more risky assets were taken on the balance sheet during good financial times,
causing an excessive buildup in risk when the tides turned. It is well documented that
lending standards decline during market upturns when both borrowers and banks are
overly confident and over-optimistic.56 Countercyclical macroprudential tools are put in
place not only to constrain excessive lending and risk-taking during good times, but also
to have a sizable buffer for banks to operate on when these risky investments fail to payoff or an overall shock to the financial system occurs. Care must also be taken, on behalf
of the banks and regulators, to ensure that these countercyclical policies do not cause a
contraction in the overall lending in the economy. Quantity based requirements, such as
capital and liquidity, should not be set at such a level that banks are forced to restrict
lending to meet these regulatory demands. A delicate balance must be struck between
guarding the financial system from unpredictable events and shocks (such as the Global
Financial Crisis), and also enabling credit creation to continue at a level consistent with
economic growth.
Countercyclical Capital Requirements
One type of instrument used in this case is a countercyclical capital buffer,
requiring banks to hold substantially more capital than is usually the case in good
financial times. Not only does this buffer serve to protect the solvency of these
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institutions during bad times, it also allows them to keep lending and reduce credit
contractions during downturns. In the recent crisis, many banks were forced to cut back
on lending in order to satisfy minimum capital requirements.
Although Basel III is moving towards capital allocation based on the probability
of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and the exposure at default (EAD)57, there is
increasing concern that this may not be adequate to protect against a systemically
damaging event in the financial system. The rules outlined in Basel III will likely
contribute to the resiliency of the financial system, but still only target the balance sheets
and activities of individual banks. Countercyclical capital requirements, and all other
macroprudential tools, require a system-wide scope, addressing the risk of concurrent
shortfalls arising from “the interconnectedness of various institutions across a host of
financial markets.”58
Dynamic Provisioning
Dynamic provisioning, a form of loan loss provisioning, requires banks to set
aside a certain amount of capital to cover expected losses from loans on their balance
sheet. The capital requirements discussed above can be understood as a type of
‘counterpart’ to loan loss provisions, held in order to cover unexpected balance sheet
losses. These provisions are, generally, determined by indicators considering the amount
of loans made (on the expectation that a portion of these will go on to default) as well as
two others that “take into account the effect of the business cycle on inherent losses and
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therefore form the basis of the macroprudential dimension of the provision.”59 As can be
seen in Table 1, dynamic provisioning is considered a tool that could be recalibrated in
order to enhance financial stability and is already being utilized in bank regulation.
Loan-to-Value and Debt-to-Income Requirements
Another tool contributing to the time dimension of macroprudential policy of
banks’ balance sheets is a cap on the maximum loan to value ratio. This, essentially,
establishes a floor at which a down payment on a loan is to be set; in other words, the
loan cannot be more than a given percentage of the value of the collateral behind it.
These constraints are intended to limit “the procyclicality of collateralized lending
because housing prices and the capacity of households to borrow based on the
collateralized value of the house interact in a procyclical manner.”60 It has been
established that lending standards decrease, and rapid credit growth results, during a
cycle upswing. Mandating that a loan cannot be above a certain value when compared to
the collateral which backs it, helps to constrain credit growth and reduces the potential
losses of these loans. Given the experience of the recent crisis, lower maximum LTV
ratios appear to be an attractive option as subprime mortgages and failing residential
loans contributed significantly to the downturn. However, there is some doubt about how
these higher ratios could contribute to preventing potential homebuyers from being able
to afford the large down payment that may be required for a mortgage.
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Debt-to-Income ratios follow in the same vein, setting a cap on the maximum
amount of debt a borrower can hold in relation to their monthly income.61 This, combined
with the LTV cap, provides banks an extra layer of assurance on the probable security of
their assets. Though currently utilized in bank regulation, these tools can be recalibrated
to be more countercyclical in nature; possibly becoming more or less strict depending on
where the economy is at in the business cycle.
Cross-Sectional Dimension
The key function of macroprudential policy in the cross-sectional dimension is
regulating each systemically important institution in proportion to their individual
contribution to systemic risk. There have been multiple methods proposed with which to
identify which institutions would fall into this category and, contingent upon systemically
important classification, how much incremental risk their failure would pose to the
financial system.62 Although many tools have been proposed to deal with systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs), only a few will be explicated here.
One key to measuring, and thus regulating, the cross-sectional dimension of risk
is to calculate each individual firm’s contribution to systemic risk. It is relatively simple
to determine which firms are likely systemically important, or too big to fail, by looking
at their size, interconnectedness and prevalence across the financial system; even looking
at the daily financial press could give one a sense of which firms hold these spots.
However, for successful macroprudential policy, this definition must become more robust
to figure out to what extent the effect of the failure of these individual firms would have
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on the financial system. Following this, cross-sectional macroprudential policy should
apply to each firm in such a way to reflect the impact of their individual contribution to
systemic risk. Acharya et al. propose a measure of systemic risk based on “how much of
the economy’s capital is being put at risk by each firm and charge each accordingly so as
to create incentives to allocate risk efficiently.”63 This method would proceed as a stress
test, looking at historical and current loss data for these systemic firms to detect how they
might respond to various macroeconomic and financial downturns. Essentially, this
method looks at the full amount of capital in the economy, what portion of this capital
‘pie’ each firm has control of, and how risky this position might be.64 The result of these
expected shortfall stress tests have a direct influence on the extent to which each
systemically important firm is subjected to macroprudential regulation. A risk to this type
of regulation is the extent to which firms can use regulatory arbitrage to ‘game’ the
system. Given that these higher capital requirements and more stringent regulations may
prove burdensome for the firms at whom they are targeted, there may be an adverse
incentive to underreport asset risks for more lenient regulation in this respect. This is
cause for concern, especially in cases where the riskiness of various assets is determined
internally and not by an outside regulator. In the sense of financial stability, there is no
benefit to these banks underreporting the risk that they may be exposed, or exposing the
financial system to, as this would render the regulation ineffectual. However, since the
imposition of regulation inevitably comes at a financial cost for firms, the regulatory
structure should be such that opportunities for arbitrage are reduced.
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With the potential limitations of firm, or sector, specific regulation in mind, below
is a sampling of the tools at the disposal of regulators to manage and, ideally, mitigate the
cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk.
Systemic Risk Tax
Following directly from the discussion of expected shortfall above, is the
macroprudential policy option of a tax on the incremental portion of systemic risk
produced by each firm. The basic foundation of this tool is the elementary economic
concept that incentives work; “the idea of collecting a tax is the incentive effect of the
tax, which is that if a bank creates a lot of risk, the bank will have to pay a higher tax.”65
Instead of just making rational decisions in pursuit of maximum profit, systemically
important institutions will be forced to, essentially, perform a cost-benefit analysis of
these risk creating activities with respect to the tax that will be incurred. Given the size of
many of these institutions, it will likely be the case that the tax will not completely deter
them from engaging in risky activities; therefore, its effectiveness may be dampened.
Another benefit of this tax, if allocated properly, is that it would provide a type of
systemic risk insurance fund that could be used in the event of future financial
strife.66This has the benefit of creating a financial buffer of money that comes directly
from the coffers of the very institutions it is put in place to protect, not from the pockets
of taxpayers.

65

Acharya 2012, 136

66

Acharya et al 2009, 293

43

Systemic Capital and Liquidity Surcharges
Following the tax on systemic risk discussed above, the systemic capital and
liquidity surcharges would also be calibrated in accordance with each bank’s contribution
to systemic risk. Outlined in Basel III, the liquidity coverage ratio is put into place to
ensure that banks have a large enough stock of high-quality short term assets to maintain
functioning over a 30- day period of stress.67 The capital surcharge is much similar to the
countercyclical capital requirement described above but calibrated at, likely, a higher
level for firms listed as systemically important. Not only do these large banks have more
to lose in an event of fire sales, contagion or some other financial shock, but their losses
and the subsequent reverberations around the system have a greater capacity to be large
and damaging to the financial system. Having a larger buffer of capital and liquidity will,
ideally, enable these banks to recover losses without having to rely on the market by
selling them at fire sale prices. These actions can undermine the confidence of the entire
financial system depending on their degree and can cause the funding markets to freeze,
as was seen in the recent crisis. Forcing banks, likely much to their chagrin, to hold more
capital will increase the internal cost of risky business while providing a cushion for
recovery if these losses do occur. In addition, the requirement to hold more capital
against assets could actually have the effect of offsetting some of the competitive
advantage that these firms have, possibly making them less ‘systemically important’. The
potential decrease of systemic importance cannot be relied upon, as many of these firms
are also closely interconnected with the financial system, allowing them to hold their
systemic influence even as their size is reduced. The complexities of these firms is such
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that targeting an individual aspect of the bank’s balance sheet or business will not
ameliorate any systemic risk they might cause. This reinforces the importance of the
technical ability on behalf of regulators to generate effective policies with which to target
the various avenues of risk arising from the cross-sectional dimension.
Central Counterparties
Another macroprudential policy tool targeting systemically important firms is the
imposition of a central clearinghouse to deal between two counterparties in a financial
deal. The presence of a central counterparty “through its opportunity to net across
different asset classes and across dealers, can lead to a substantial reduction in risk and a
substantial improvement in allocational efficiency.”68 This mainly addresses the
interconnectedness of banks through the derivatives market and can facilitate a
consolidation of these activities to a small number of entities. Central counterparties can
bolster the financial infrastructure and increase the resilience of the financial system to
weaknesses in individual firms. In addition, “the failure of a systemically important
utility…could have consequences as severe for financial stability as the failure of one or
more systemically important financial institutions.”69 Therefore, the use of central
counterparties for financial utility services is potentially beneficial both for the stability
of the individual firms and also of the widespread financial infrastructure. The presence
of a central clearinghouse also brings the issue of moral hazard to the fore as while, in the
event of failure, some still remains, “it [moral hazard] would be much more muted than
in the case of individual financial institutions, both because the clearing corporation is
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more transparent…”70 These developments would be advantageous to the financial
system as much of the activity that could cause excess risk at individual firms is
consolidated into one, thus also increasing transparency. Therefore, a higher capital
charge for transactions undertaken outside of the central counterparty system is another
attempt at dis-incentivizing potentially excessive risk-taking in pursuit of
macroprudential regulation.
Orderly Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions
Another important aspect of macroprudential regulation, though not necessarily
considered a ‘tool’, is the ability to allow large and systemically important institutions to
fail without damaging the broader economy. During the recent crisis, there was a gap in
understanding regarding the distinction between institutions that should have been
allowed to fail and those whose failure would have disrupted the financial system; going
forward, this can no longer be a question. Although failure of any one of these
institutions will inevitably have an adverse effect, it is important, in a well-functioning
financial system that those who make bad business decisions are allowed to fail, with
owners and shareholders experiencing the brunt of the loss as opposed to taxpayers.71
Dodd-Frank Title II establishes the Orderly Liquidation Authority which outlines
procedures for the liquidation of large bank holding companies and non-bank financial
institutions.72 This can only be used when officials from the Treasury, the Federal
Reserve and the FDIC agree that the standard bankruptcy procedure could cause
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instability in the system as a whole.73 A delicate balance must be struck between
preventing the failure of systemically important financial institutions and running the
moral hazard risk of having them believe that they are truly ‘too big to fail’.74 There are
still questions about the extent to which this provision can be used to completely prevent
bailouts and the use of taxpayer money to rescue struggling institutions.
It is also important to realize that certain regulations or resolutions, though
economically ideal, may be politically untenable. For example, after the banking crisis in
Sweden, the government effectively nationalized failing banks, creating a so-called ‘bad
bank’ with the remaining assets.75 Although top management and shareholders’ equity
was wiped out in the process, government funds were utilized in the process. Given the
political backlash that occurred during the crisis-era bailouts, the creation of a bad bank
with government money, though beneficial in the future, would likely fail in a society as
averse to nationalization as the United States. The range of possible outcomes is bounded
by those that would be allowable by the citizens of the country, for better or worse.
Although this puts constraints on the extent to which regulators can act, the politicization
of regulations is generally considered less of a breach of independence than a mere ‘fact
of life’ that must be dealt with.
As can be seen, the macroprudential policy tools aimed at the cross sectional
dimension of systemic risk have significant potential to decrease excessive risk-taking in
the financial system. However, given the immense financial power of many of these
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financial firms, a balance must be struck between strong regulation and targeted
incentives. Successful macroprudential policies aimed at systemically important firms
will require a complex set of discretion and rule based regulation accounting for the size,
interconnectedness and unique characteristics of each of them. When considering
macroprudential regulation, one must keep in mind that, given that there exists no
universally agreed-upon definition of systemic risk (and therefore no explicit mandate for
macroprudential regulation), flexibility in this area of regulation is key. Those in charge
need to be able to fluidly adapt to different risk factors, specific institutional situations
and economy-wide developments and, “given the exceptional characteristic of each
financial crisis, it is not advisable to solely base reform on past experience.”76 It is
essential to put the responsibility of macroprudential regulation in the hands of an
institution, or group of institutions, that employ a long-term, forward-looking and
adaptive perspective to regulation and the reduction of risk. Focusing only on the
regulatory gaps that were important in the last crisis will not prepare us to stave off, or
weather, the next. Proper governance, experience and expertise are needed to employ
these macroprudential tools, making them effective at enhancing the stability of the
financial system.
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CHAPTER FIVE: GOVERNANCE OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES AND
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
The complexity, and relative conceptual infancy, of macroprudential regulation
demands an equally careful and complex governance system to ensure its proper
functioning. It may be most appropriate to use a quite casual, if not trite, question: who is
best suited to take away the punch bowl? The punch bowl in this case is composed of the
multitude of risky positions and actions taken by financial institutions in order to gain
vast profit, potentially at the expense of financial stability. It is likely that the very
institutions that macroprudential is designed to regulate will dissent and agreement will
be scant. Macroprudential policymaking suffers as a result of two main aspects: the
constant evolution of the financial system and a tendency towards inaction on behalf of
policy makers. These two aspects will be considered in a discussion of the optimal
governance structure for macroprudential regulation, what organizations should be
involved and what actions they should take.
The potential for inaction on behalf of policymakers and regulators is one main
risk facing the implementation, and effectiveness, of macroprudential regulation.
Macroprudential policies looking to protect against systemic risk are crucial to the
maintenance of financial stability, but, as of now, there are very few indicators and
barometers with which the success of these policies can be measured. This, combined
with the fact that these policies take a direct aim at specific organizations or actions
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causing systemic risk, creates an environment where “given uncertainty regarding lowprobability events entailing high costs, it is difficult to press the button particularly in
good times.”77 Macroprudential policies are generally undertaken during normal times
when it may not be immediately apparent that they are needed. Given that their effects
can be relatively immediate and transparent (e.g. reduction in lending because of
increased capital requirements or individuals being denied mortgages because of more
stringent loan-to-value requirements) it is likely that there will be significant pushback
from many different players.
There is a significant time lag between when a policy is enacted to proactively
combat financial instability and when the effect of this policy becomes evident; in fact, if
the policy has its intended effect, the impetus for the policy may never be publicly
observed. If the goal of macroprudential policy and the financial stability mandate is to
prevent financial crises, their absence indicates success; though this absence may not
provide sufficient rationale to the financial institutions being regulated. This is a
conundrum to be dealt with as “while there is a constituency against inflation, there is
hardly any against the inebriating feeling of getting richer.”78 Macroprudential policies,
then, need to be governed by a legitimate and accountable institution, or set of
institutions, which will not fall prey to this tendency towards inaction either to please
financial institutions, politicians or other organizations.
Another aspect to consider regarding the governance of macroprudential
regulation is the amount of expertise required to effectively design and implement these
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policies. The financial system is constantly evolving and innovating, different institutions
come to the fore while others fade into the background; the macroprudential regulator
must always be aware of these changes. A decision must be made about whether
macroprudential policy will be based on either rules or discretion. To maintain
accountability, it is necessary for some rules governing the use of macroprudential policy
to be put into place, but discretion is also highly important. A static set of rules will be
quickly outpaced by the dynamism of the financial system. With this in mind, the
macroprudential regulator should either be endowed with or possess the following three
powers: information collection, designation and rulemaking/calibration.79
The power of information collection is aimed at having access to the constantly
evolving data on the financial system. Oftentimes this will not be concentrated in a single
location or database and may only be available through interaction with individual firms
which are not subjected to traditional supervision and regulation.80 This requires a degree
of trust and authority vested in the macroprudential regulator which can be enhanced by
the governance structure under which it operates. Currently in the United States, this role
is taken on by the Office of Financial Research which collects and provides data to
support the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and its constituent members in
the pursuit for financial stability. Although, in theory, the Office of Financial Research
provides a crucial service, much of the financial and institution-specific data could likely
be more effectively gathered by the organizations in charge of routinely monitoring and
supervising these institutions. Along with much of the structure of the FSOC, the work of
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the Office of Financial Research may have to be recalibrated to achieve the optimal
financial stability result, but this will be addressed in a later section.
A second required power of macroprudential authorities, designation, looks at the
ability for the macroprudential regulator to designate given institutions as systemically
important. This is an important aspect of the financial stability mandate as careful
monitoring must ensue to make certain that all potentially systemically important
institutions are considered. Labeling an institution as systemic will, under the
macroprudential framework, subject them to more stringent capital, liquidity and other
requirements when compared to their non-systemic peers. This, too, will likely instigate
pushback as this status is not financially optimal for many institutions. The governance of
the macroprudential authority must be such that the possible influences arising from these
institutions will not affect their decision-making and the appropriate designation is made.
One possibility of ineffective or imprudent designation is that “increasing the level of
systemic risk imposed by a bank renders regulators more forbearing with that institution
and more stringent with the other (non-systemic) institutions.”81 The power to designate
institutions as systemically important also must transcend legal boundaries to include
non-bank financial institutions.
Finally, the macroprudential governance structure must include a rulemaking and
calibration power in its operations. This was alluded to above as, given the constantly
evolving nature of the financial system, no one set of rules will be appropriate at all
points in time and in all situations. If, for instance, a set of rules is calibrated given a
certain level of risk at a unique point in time, it is likely that “they will be overly
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burdensome some of the time and insufficiently tight at other times.”82 The systemic
regulator must have the power to recalibrate these rules and tools when it deems
necessary based on legitimate developments in financial markets and data. The
calibration of the policy tools should consider the cross-sectional and time dimension of
systemic risk separately as these may uniquely exert influence on systemic risk at certain
points in time under certain conditions. This, along with the other required powers,
commands an institution with a high level of technical expertise, coupled with relatively
unfettered accountability as these policies and decisions will have a direct impact, and
potentially immediate, effect on the financial system.
The governance structure of macroprudential regulations needs to have two key
prerequisites for optimal functioning: a designated authority responsible for
macroprudential policies with a clear mandate as well as a method for coordination
across different economic policies.83 The decision between having a single regulator in
charge of macroprudential policy or a committee of various organizations will differ in
each country considered, but these two prerequisites still apply. Given the fact that the
benefits and results of macroprudential policies are not easily seen or interpreted, a clear
mandate will be crucial to combat the tendency towards inaction seen in these types of
policies.
A challenge for macroprudential policymaking is the natural asymmetry between
different policy tools and their effects. For instance, some tools of macroprudential
policies will effectively constrain credit while monetary policy may seek to spur credit
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and money supply growth in the economy during upswings, to prepare for and hedge
against a downturn. As each arm of economic policy uniquely interact, it is necessary for
the macroprudential authority to contain some mechanism for interaction to make sure
that these policies are aligned to the greatest extent possible. This could be achieved
through the establishment of committees consisting of the organizations in charge of each
policy function (monetary, macroprudential, fiscal, crisis management, etc.) with the
responsibility to coordinate policies to achieve different aims at various times in the
business and financial cycle. Following this, an important consideration in
macroprudential policy is how much the Treasury Department should be involved in such
an organization, stemming from the degree of independence from the government that is
necessary for each policy function. A clear benefit of involving the Treasury on the
macroprudential committee is the legitimacy it brings to these functions as well as in the
case where “primary legislation is required to increase the effectiveness of financial
policies.”84 This committee structure may be beneficial for a holistic approach to putting
macroprudential regulation in the appropriate scope of economic policy actions, but
issues of government involvement and independence may arise.
A clear mandate is crucial to both map out a path for macroprudential regulation
to follow as well as to establish legitimacy and accountability of this new policy agenda.
This mandate should simultaneously open up and constrain the use of policy tools in
order to pursue a primary objective of preventing financial crisis with a secondary
objective of ensuring financial stability, contingent on not interfering with other policy
objectives. The immediate effects of macroprudential policies may be misunderstood and
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it is highly likely that they will be contested, therefore a legitimate and accountable
institutional figurehead, endowed with the aforementioned responsibilities will be the key
to the success of macroprudential policy. The pursuit of financial stability with the
implementation of macroprudential policy is an important development in today’s policy
landscape, and “in the absence of an easily quantifiable measure by which to judge the
performance of the macroprudential authority, the devolution of substantial
powers…require a strong political consensus and a high degree of trust in the ability and
integrity of the macroprudential policymaker.”85 For this and other reasons, it appears to
be most appropriate that an accountable, legitimate and historically trusted institution
should take on this responsibility; in this case, the Federal Reserve. Although an
institution or committee specifically created with financial stability as its goal (for
example, the FSOC) is beneficial and furthers the aim of financial stability, the lack of
established performance, accountability or trust may be a disadvantage. In a theoretical
and historical sense, the central bank appears to be the institution best suited to adopt an
explicit financial stability mandate given its pre-established independence and expertise
in the mandate of price and macroeconomic stability.86 The Federal Reserve’s sphere of
influence reaches both within the pre-established policy and financial domain, putting it
as a prime contender to take on the ever-increasing role of macroprudential regulator.
It can be argued that, even before the importance of financial stability came into
the fore, the Federal Reserve was already working toward this aim. As one of the main
regulators overseeing the supervision and regulation of banking institutions and the
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lender of last resort to those same institutions, the central bank has been heavily involved
in stability. These financial stability aspects have been embedded into the activities of the
Federal Reserve since its founding in 1913; the crisis, and the rise of macroprudential
regulation, is only switching the timing and orientation of this focus. Historically, the
focus on financial stability has been ex post, cleaning up after bubbles burst, institutions
failed, or credit markets took a turn for the worst.87 This orientation is now changing as
there is a renewed call for systemic risks to be identified before it is too late; the Federal
Reserve is being called upon to be the ‘smoke alarm’ and no longer the ‘fire
extinguisher’.88 The Fed was the only organization with tacit responsibilities for systemic
stability prior to the crisis, and it would follow that they would continue to accept and
enhance these responsibilities today. As a result of this past experience and present
capabilities, the Federal Reserve is at an optimal position to tackle systemic risk and take
on the role of the macroprudential regulator.
The Federal Reserve possesses a high level of expertise and experience that can
be smoothly applied to systemic risk management and the financial stability mandate.
Given that macroprudential regulation/systemic risk management and monetary policy
both target the macro side of the economy, if coordinated properly, these have the
potential to mesh well. The Federal Reserve has a skilled workforce that can utilize their
skills and capabilities in order to further the aims of financial stability. Another important
aspect of the Federal Reserve’s activities is their participation in daily trading
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relationships with financial market actors89. The Federal Reserve is at a good place to
monitor any developments in the financial system and is able to flag looming problems
that it may detect. This occurs not only through trading but also through the regular
supervision activities included in the Federal Reserve’s microprudential duties. The
regulatory duties included in microprudential regulation allowed the supervisors to gather
information about the safety and soundness of financial institutions (mainly commercial
banks and bank holding companies) that, when taken together, can inform the discussion
of the current state of systemic risk. The Federal Reserve is involved, in one way or
another, with almost every aspect of macroprudential issues and would be at an optimal
position to apply this knowledge to another regulatory pursuit.
The Federal Reserve has also built up a wealth of knowledge in economic
policymaking through the conduct of monetary policy. Given that both macroprudential
and monetary policy are targeted at the health of the macro-economy, knowledge can be
shared between the two policy tasks. Although macroprudential focuses more on the
financial, as opposed to real, sector of the economy, “due to their existing role in
monetary policy, central banks can bring expertise in the analysis of aggregate risks that
can be brought to bear in the design of policies designed to reduce the expected cost of
aggregate weakness.”90 A major difference between monetary policy and
macroprudential policy is the timeframe during which each is effective in the event of a
financial crisis or systemic event. The domain of macroprudential policy is ex ante,
designed to build financial sector resilience and to reduce the probability that a crisis will
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occur. Monetary policy, on the other hand can be utilized ex ante and ex post, as was
evidenced by the unconventional monetary policies enacted after the crisis. It is important
to put the aim and desired effect into context as, “regulation can only affect flows and not
reduce the stock of debt.”91 It is important to realize that monetary and macroprudential
policies are not, in fact, independent, but are inextricably linked as each can affect the
other in a distinct way, either beneficially or adversely. Some argue that this may threaten
the Federal Reserve’s independence92 (which will be discussed in detail below), but this
dependence of mechanisms could also bolster support of the central bank taking on the
role as macro-regulator. The ability for the Federal Reserve to operate both of these
mechanisms of policy would allow them to utilize their already-established expertise in
pursuit of a slightly different policy goal. If one organization is in charge of setting both
arms of policy, more care will likely be made to ensure that they do not conflict or
counteract one another without a need for a great amount of coordination between
agencies.
The Federal Reserve and central banks more generally, are also less likely to fall
prey to the tendency towards inaction regarding the implementation of macroprudential
policy. This can be explained by the fact that the Fed is the lender of last resort in the
case of a crisis. In the event that a crisis occurs, the central bank is expected to step in to
clean up; acting, again, as the fire extinguisher for the financial system. In light of this,
the Fed has a large incentive to prevent an unsustainable buildup of systemic risk by
utilizing macroprudential policy tools as, if this is not done, it will be their responsibility
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to address the unwinding of this risk position ex post. In addition, if these risks are
allowed to grow to an unsustainable level, the Fed might have to utilize monetary policy
to ‘lean against the wind’ and use monetary policy, as opposed to macroprudential
policies, for stabilization. This can be very costly as reigning in excessive credit growth
for the financial sector will lead to an overall credit contraction which could have
negative consequences for growth in the real economy. Therefore, the Fed, as the
macroprudential regulator, will be more likely to encourage timely and efficient policy
actions in pursuit of financial stability.
In the century that the Federal Reserve has been in existence, it has gained a
significant amount of credibility and trust. This factor, although almost exclusively
reputational, is crucial for the smooth functioning of the governance of a new
macroprudential regulatory structure. As has been repeatedly emphasized in the policy
debate, academic literature and in this very paper, is the fact that macroprudential policies
targeting specific sectors or classes of institutions will, almost inevitably, be contentious.
The way the Federal Reserve approaches the setting of interest rates and conduct of
monetary policy, with an emphasis on transparency and accountability, will also be
advantageous for the conduct of macroprudential policies. This will be the case to a
greater degree in such instances where the target of a given policy is less visible than
inflation or employment and, thus, will be important to integrate in the policies used to
avoid crises. Putting the duty to execute macroprudential policies for the aim of financial
stability in the hands of the Federal Reserve would allow a well-equipped and time-tested
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agency to take responsibility for what will inevitably be some controversial economic
policy decisions.
Given the complicated and nuanced nature of macroprudential policy, care must
be taken to organize and govern it in a prudent way. As a tendency towards inaction is
likely to prevail under certain circumstances or arrangements, it is crucial to designate an
accountable organization at its helm that is willing to do what it takes to ensure the
stability of the financial system. Though no single entity would be a perfect choice, and
any governance structure will require significant cooperation, the Federal Reserve is at a
good position to adopt financial stability as a mandate and move forward with the
execution of macroprudential policy. Given its history of expertise in monetary policy
and supervision combined with the likelihood of its willingness to act and existing
credibility, the Federal Reserve should play a key role, if not the singular leading role, in
macroprudential regulation.
The structures with which the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy and
microprudential regulation are an optimal starting point for the successful implementation
of macroprudential policy. The lynchpin of this success is said to be the operational
independence granted to the Fed, which allows monetary policy to be conducted with a
long-run scope, not subjected to political pressures. Although the consensus on the
interaction between independence and an indicator of monetary policy effectiveness (e.g.
inflation) has not been proven in the case of macroprudential policy, the different
characteristics of independence are likely to improve the effectiveness of this class of
policy as well.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE NEXUS OF FINANCIAL STABILITY AND CENTRAL
BANK INDEPENDENCE - SHOULD THE FEDERAL RESERVE ADOPT AN
EXPLICIT FINANCIAL STABILITY MANDATE?
As can be seen from the discussion above, for many reasons, the Federal Reserve
is an ideal organization to play a role, if not the leading role, in the push towards financial
stability. To go one step farther, many economic actors and commentators, not least being
the authors of the Squam Lake Report, advocate that “the central bank should be given an
explicit mandate for maintaining the systemic stability of the financial system.”93
However, the question still remains: if the Federal Reserve adds financial stability to its
mandate, what will become of their ever sought after and oft spoken of independence?
Because of the many institutions involved in the pursuit of financial stability and
macroprudential regulation, it is inevitable that the landscape of central bank activities
and independence will change. The interaction of central bank independence and a
financial stability mandate runs in two distinct directions: the pre-established
independence will likely benefit the functioning of macroprudential regulation, although
this regulation may detract from independence. Although there are some areas where
complete independence may not be able to be conserved, it is likely that the
independence enshrined in the Federal Reserve will serve to further improve and
strengthen the execution of macroprudential policies in pursuit of financial stability.
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As was mentioned earlier, central bank independence has been a general tenet of
‘optimal’ central banking since the 1980’s. This occurred as a result of many empirical
and theoretical research studies that “amply documented that independent central banks
achieve lower and less volatile inflation rates than those that are beholden to governments
in power, and that they do so at no long-run cost to economic output.”94 The widespread
idea that central bank independence was, in fact, ideal was enforced by these studies,
taking it beyond a theoretical musing to an empirical fact that lower and more stable
inflation followed from independence. Fast forward to today and, starkly juxtaposed to
this, there is the largely undefined and scarcely tested macroprudential regulation. Given
that it is not even a decade from the onset of the crisis, which was the impetus for the rise
in importance for macroprudential regulation, the costs or benefits are not nearly as well
defined, or understood. According to Haldane, “the state of knowledge about
macroprudential regimes today is roughly where monetary policy was in the ‘40s.”95
Because of this, there is no way of knowing what effect the presence or lack of
independence will have on macroprudential regulation, but, using the experience of
monetary policy as an example, it is likely that it will help, rather than hinder, its
effectiveness. Therefore, independence should be granted and defined in principle, based
on sound logic and past experience on the conduct of successful macroeconomic policies.
Independence of the central bank, especially when that entity has a financial
stability mandate, can actually be advantageous. These advantages primarily arise in the
same way for financial stability as they do for price stability and monetary policy. One
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specific benefit is the long-run view of independent central banks in the setting of policy,
harkening back to the time-inconsistency problem discussed above. The thrust towards
financial stability must focus on the long-term at an even greater degree than other
macroeconomic policies as financial cycles tend to have an average duration double that
of the traditional business cycle.96 Also, “political authorities may have an incentive to
distort macroprudential policies in the short run – for example by preventing the
imposition of countercyclical capital requirements…to the detriment of long- or mediumterm financial stability.”97 It is likely that these short-term political tendencies would be
exacerbated even further in the case of macroprudential policies as these target large and
profitable financial institutions, producing more of an immediate and noticeable effect
than monetary policy instruments. Given the financial strength of many of these
institutions, combined with their intense lobbying powers, political entities may be more
willing to relax those standards to facilitate acceptance. The isolation of an independent
central bank from these pressures will allow macroprudential policies to be enacted
proportional to the systemic risks generated by the financial system with minimal
interference from specific interest groups or lobbies.
Adding financial stability to the Federal Reserve’s pre-established mandate has
the potential to have multiple implications on their current dual mandate of price stability
and full employment. Monetary policy is the most important duty of the Fed and its
independence must be fully protected even if the structure of financial stability is more
cooperative. A requirement of financial stability and macroprudential policies is that they
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not impinge on operationally independent monetary policies. There is some concern that
financial stability may counteract the prevailing monetary policy stance if they are
working in the opposite direction. It can be argued, however, that monetary policy
instruments, alone, can be employed to move towards financial stability. Monetary
policy, if effective at ensuring price stability, promotes financial stability through low and
stable inflation; combining this with the lender of last resort function, the Federal Reserve
already employs some strong tools working towards financial stability. For instance,
“some argued that monetary policy should be used to help lean on asset price bubbles
while they were still in the early forming stage so they would not grow excessively
large.”98 Given the challenges related to accurately identifying and dealing with asset
price bubbles, targeted macroprudential policies can be treated as a more efficient
substitute to a contractionary monetary policy attempting to curb lending.
Macroprudential regulation specifically targets the financial sector whereas monetary
policy is more broad based, operating with a price mechanism reverberating from the
financial to real economy. Therefore, targeting macroprudential policy to specific
institutions or activities in the financial sector will likely have less of an impact on the
economy as a whole than if monetary tools were used. In addition, “severe financial
distress can numb the effectiveness of standard macroeconomic tools, such as monetary
and fiscal policies.”99 In the long run, a financial stability mandate, though taking away
some of the institutional focus on price stability and full employment, may actually be
helpful as an effective financial stability regime could limit risk to a certain point where
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instability is less likely. Care must be taken to ensure that financial stability does not
significantly conflict or interfere with the functioning of monetary policy as this would be
diluting the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s primary mandate, thereby putting their
credibility, and operational independence, at risk.
Although the objectives of monetary policy and financial stability may conflict at
some points in time, the independence of monetary policy may necessitate the central
bank to have a significant, or leading, role in macroprudential policy. If the central bank
does not have primary control over macroprudential regulation, “delegating
macroprudential authority to a government agency other than the central bank may
threaten the bank’s independence over its price stability mandate.”100 As many of the
instruments of both monetary and macroprudential policy effect both the price and
quantity of money, coordination is necessary. Delegating both of these roles exclusively
to the central bank will reduce the cost of coordination by housing both monetary policy
and financial stability in one organization able to control the tools and mechanisms with
which each is carried out.
Adding a mandate, possibly granted to the Federal Reserve by Congress, will be
important for the preservation of operational independence. Accountability is
complemented by the fact that the central bank enacts policies according to the aims set
out by their mandate. An explicit financial stability mandate would pave the way for the
Federal Reserve to take a more proactive and central role in preventing financial crises,
ex ante as opposed to ex post. This has the potential to shield the Fed of the criticisms
advanced that they were overstepping their mandate by enacting the unconventional
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policies taken during and after the financial crisis. Broadening the scope of the central
bank’s mandate does, in fact, carry risks but, given the increasing importance of financial
stability and systemic risk, this is likely a necessary development.
Potential Challenges to Independence
The current structure for macroprudential regulation in the United States,
established by the Dodd-Frank Act and led by the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), has the potential to undermine the independence of the Federal Reserve. The
FSOC, which is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, has as its mandate:
“…to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise
from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large,
interconnected bank holding companies or non-bank financial companies, or that
could arise out the financial services marketplace.”101
It goes on to say that the FSOC should, essentially, advise financial institution
regulators of possible emerging liquidity, credit or market risk that could pose a threat to
financial stability. The structure of the FSOC, with the Federal Reserve as one of several
voting members, reduces their functional independence with respect to macroprudential
regulation.102 Although the Federal Reserve is only one of multiple organizations
involved in the FSOC, it is assumed that most supervisory and regulatory actions would
be designated as the responsibility of the central bank as the FSOC has not implemented
in-house procedures to do so. The combination of the lack of a clear FSOC mandate and
the Federal Reserve’s de facto responsibility for financial stability leads to reduced
independence but also reduces the accountability it has for any subsequent policy
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actions.103 Although the establishment of the FSOC through Title I of Dodd-Frank lays
the groundwork for a much-needed institutional macroprudential framework, reforms
should be made in order to bolster the role of the Federal Reserve to ensure more
effective and independent macroprudential regulation. The continuation of the FSOC in
its current form, with no clear authority on policy implementation, could not only
undermine the Federal Reserve’s role and subsequent independence, but could dampen
the effectiveness of macroprudential regulation nationwide.
Another specific question must be posed to assess the degree of central bank
independence: independence from whom? Classically, central bank independence has
constituted independence from government and politicians. However, with the onset of
the crisis and resultant financial sector changes, there needs to also be assurance that
banks are independent from the financial sector and the institutions that it contains. This
is especially crucial when considering financial stability. Financial institutions, especially
those that are deemed systemically important, have a vast amount of resources and
lobbying power in political situations. Given that macroprudential policies are directed at
these systemically important institutions, they are “likely to be subject to intense
lobbying and political scrutiny from financial sector actors who would accuse regulators
of taking away the punch bowl once the party gets going.”104 It is important to ensure that
the Federal Reserve, or any macroprudential regulator, does not experience regulatory
capture as a result of an inordinate amount of influence from the regulated institutions.
Although this can manifest in many forms, one of the most discussed is that of the
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‘revolving door’ between the Federal Reserve, and other regulators, and the financial
system. The revolving door is, essentially, the movement of “regulatory personnel
between the official and private sector that allegedly incentivizes regulatory personnel to
soften their regulatory stance due to the prospect of future lucrative employment.”105
Given that macroprudential regulation is far more targeted than monetary policy, specific
relationships can be built up between the regulators and the institutions, thereby making
them more vulnerable to this regulatory capture. This adds another layer on to the
conventional stance of independence from government that could pose challenges for the
Federal Reserve in the future. Concerted efforts to ensure robust regulation in spite of
lobbying and influence will be important to prevent regulatory capture.
The issue of democratic accountability must also be considered when looking at
the possibility of a financial stability mandate for the Federal Reserve. The practice of
central bank independence has been criticized on the grounds that an independent
organization is making crucial economic policy decisions without being under the
explicit purview of the government. Adding a financial stability mandate to this already
strained relationship between independence and democratic accountability could further
threaten the legitimacy of the foundations of central bank independence in some circles.
This has the potential to put more pressure on the government to reevaluate the Federal
Reserve’s independence which could hinder its effectiveness. Given the direct impact that
macroprudential policies can have on individual sectors, financial institutions and even
classes of borrowers, questions will arise on whether or not the central bank should be
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‘allowed’ to enact these policies.106 The presence of these criticisms will necessitate a
more cooperative regime based on accountability on different levels and to different
sectors. Again, this cooperative nature of financial stability cannot spill over into the
conduct of monetary policy as this would serve to erode the operational independence
which has been deemed necessary for execution of these policies.
The key to preserving the appropriate degree of operational, political and
economic independence for the Federal Reserve, conditional on adopting a financial
stability mandate, is to devise an appropriate institutional setup where the independence
of the two macro policies is divorced from one another. The very nature of
macroprudential policy is such that many organizations, regulators and governmental
actors will need to be involved as each performs a specific function contributing towards
the aim of financial stability. As mentioned earlier, though the presence of the Treasury
would lessen the complete autonomy of the policymaking process, it also has the
capabilities of turning these recommendations into legislation which could bolster the
legitimacy of the policies. The optimal independence of Federal Reserve activities, then,
will preserve full operational independence in monetary policy with a more cooperative
structure for financial stability. Given that one organization must be granted differing
degrees of independence for two different arms of policy, a delicate balance between the
two is crucial. This is ultimately dependent upon “the appropriateness and robustness of
institutional arrangements for financial stability.”107 One way to enhance this separation
is a strict exclusivity of the policy tools focused on macroprudential and monetary policy.
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Whereas monetary policy primarily works through the ‘price’ mechanism of money
through setting interest rates, macroprudential will move towards focusing on the
‘quantity’, looking at the amount of leverage, liquidity, capital, etc. in the financial
system. It is inevitable that these policies will both conflict and complement each other at
different parts of the financial and business cycles and in different situations; however,
with the appropriate institutional setup, these conflicts should not pose an exigent risk to
the continued effectiveness of macroprudential or monetary policy.
Given that the final structure of macroprudential regulation is still being debated
and constructed, one cannot say with certainty what challenges may occur both for
central bank independence as well as the push towards financial stability. One aspect is
certain, though, that an organization with an in-depth knowledge of the financial system
and experience in regulating it should have primary responsibility for this set of policy
tools outside the realm of what has been utilized before. Bringing with it operational
independence, time-tested experience and credibility, the Federal Reserve is at a prime
position to take on this responsibility and it is likely that a failure to do so would do more
harm than good to the effectiveness of macroeconomic policymaking.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: FINANCIAL STABILITY PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION
Taking the experience of the crisis and the evidence presented here into
consideration, going forward, the Federal Reserve should be given more responsibility in
ensuring the stability of the financial system. Ideally, this will come in the form of a
specific mandate, highlighting the increased importance of macroprudential regulation
and systemic risk recognition. The operation of this mandate should be carried out by the
Federal Reserve in financial stability-focused research and policy departments as well as
through cooperation with other entities and organizations throughout the country. Ideally,
the structure and the functioning of the FSOC would be subsumed into the Federal
Reserve but, given constraints, it may be more practical for the Federal Reserve to be
given a leading role in the organization.
Going forward, central bank independence should be considered in the creation of
new organizations and leadership plans for financial stability, but emphasis should not be
unduly imposed. The nature of central bank independence has changed and it will evolve
as the new post-crisis financial regulatory structure is created and honed. It can be argued
that the indices, measurements and previous studies of central bank independence have
been invalidated by the crisis, but the independence of the Federal Reserve in economic
policymaking must still be considered. The question still stands: in a post-crisis world,
what is independence?
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It must be recognized that there is a limit to the Federal Reserve’s effectiveness as
a unilateral actor in the pursuit for financial stability. This arises primarily through the
fact that the Federal Reserve is only responsible for regulating a subset of the financial
institutions within the system. The adoption of these other regulatory responsibilities by
the Federal Reserve would be inefficient and, therefore, cooperation with the other
existing regulators will be important. In this construct, it is crucial to realize that,
especially considering financial stability, independence is not autonomy. The Federal
Reserve’s policies and actions can still be independent from outside and government
influence while engaging in information sharing and cooperation with other regulators
such as the FDIC or SEC. The Treasury should also be endowed with a role, as the ability
to turn tacit regulations into required legislation will be important in the effort to ensure
compliance and build the legitimacy of macroprudential policies.
Though the trajectory of central bank independence after the crisis is still in
question, it can confidently be asserted that the landscape has changed. Facing negative
inflation as a result of a crisis of stability and confidence that reverberated around the
world, the focus and thrust of central bank independence must be revised. The
cooperative nature of financial stability may threaten independence, the presence of the
Treasury may threaten independence, strong financial interests may even threaten
independence, but this may be a sacrifice that will be valuable to make. The body of
literature on this topic, specifically, is still in a nascent stage and there is vastly more
work to do, and through this, many new questions will arise. It is no longer an issue of
whether or not financial stability will threaten central bank independence, but in what
72

form the post-crisis central bank independence will take if and when the dual mandate
expands to include the pursuit of financial stability.
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